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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee C. Steven Fehlauer ("Fehlauer") agrees with the 
statement of jurisdiction contained in Appellant's principal 
brief. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Fehlauer accepts Schwartz's framing of the first issue 
for review presented in his principal brief, "Did the trial court 
abuse its discretion by conducting the trial on the same day that 
Schwartz was a candidate in a primary election for the 
Massachusetts Legislature?" Fehlauer concurs that this Court 
should apply the strict 'abuse of discretion' standard of review 
when considering this issue. (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). 
2. Fehlauer disagrees with the framing of the second issue 
presented for review, "May an express condition precedent 
providing that the contractual obligation to sell property is 
subject to the sale of another property on or before a specific 
date, be satisfied by substantial performance?" Schwartz claims 
that this issue calls for a 'correction of error' standard of 
review. (Appellant's Brief, p. 2). 
The primary problem with Schwartz's framing of this issue is 
that the trial court never made a finding that the contractual 
clause in question was an express condition precedent. (R. 160-
172). Instead, the court's examination of the clause focused on 
the materiality of the closing date mentioned in the clause (R. 
164, 168-71); both parties' trial briefs highlighted materiality 
of the closing date as a significant issue for Judge Young's 
consideration. (R. 76, 93-4) . 
Judge Young correctly recognized the irrelevance of whether 
the entire contractual clause at issue was a condition precedent. 
The real concern in the proceedings below, and the proper issue 
for review by this Court, was whether the closing date mentioned 
in that clause was so material that it should effect the 
avoidance of an otherwise enforceable land contract. The trial 
court's finding that the closing date was not material is a fac-
tual matter that this Court may only reject if clearly erroneous. 
Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993); Ong 
Intern. (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 454 n.25 (Utah 
1993). Schwartz carries the burden of marshalling the evidence 
to prove that the factual finding was clearly erroneous. Ong 
Intern.. 850 P.2d at 454 n.25. 
3. Schwartz's final issue for review deals with the trial 
court's third alternate ground for judgment, that it could 
"reform" the contractual clause to mirror the parties' under-
standing and intent. (R. 171). Schwartz asks if the "trial 
court [can] reform an express condition where the trial court did 
not find a mutual mistake of fact?" (Appellant's Brief, p. 3). 
As discussed below, the trial court did not actually "reform" the 
contractual clause in its third ground for relief. Rather, it 
emphasized the word "sale" in the clause, recognizing that pursu-
ant to agreements already in place by July 6, the Hoytsville Road 
property had been sold. Since the trial court never reformed the 
contract, the final issue raised by Schwartz is not an issue at 
all. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. After Fehlauer And Schwartz Entered A Contract For The 
Sale Of Land To Fehlauer, Schwartz Decided Not To Honor The 
Contract. 
Dr. C. Steven Fehlauer and his wife were searching for a 
piece of property in 1993 on which to build a house and raise 
their young family. (R. 163). While driving in Coalville one 
day, the Fehlauers noticed a parcel for sale that they believed 
ideal for their needs. (R. 163, 319). The property (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Fehlauer parcel") was owned by Thomas 
Schwartz, a Massachusetts resident. (R. 162). 
Schwartz had bought the Fehlauer parcel in 1992 as the 
southern part of a single larger piece of property. (R. 162). 
Schwartz decided to sell the entire piece of property in 1993 and 
listed it with Coldwell Banker in Park City. (R. 162). Nancy 
Madsen offered to buy the northern portion of the property 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Madsen parcel")1 in early 1993. 
(R. 162-3). On May 20, 1993, Madsen and Schwartz signed an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement securing the sale of the Madsen 
parcel. (R. 96-7; Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8)(copies of the 
Exhibits are attached as "Addendum A"). By its terms, the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement documented the "sale" of the Madsen 
parcel on this date. (R. 96-7; Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8, p.l 
Hi(a) and (b); p.4 \ Q) . The Agreement designated July 1 as the 
*The northern portion Madsen bought was divided and sold to her 
as two portions to facilitate financing. (R. 162) . Her two 
portions are referred to as one parcel for sake of convenience. It 
is important to note that, as to the southernmost portion of the 
Madsen parcel, Schwartz carried all of the financing. 
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closing date for the Madsen parcel because this was the date 
Schwartz had to make a balloon payment on the property to his 
lender.2 (R. 96-7; Plaintiff's Exhibits 7 and 8). July 1 
concededly has some materiality. However, Schwartz voluntarily 
extended the closing date to July 6 because he feared the closing 
might not occur on July 1 and that extra time might be needed. 
(R. 165) . 
The closing of the Madsen parcel did not occur by July 6, 
but there was a grace period extending the closing date on the 
northeasternmost property, at least.3 (R. 166). The Madsen 
parcel closed on July 16, well within the grace period. (R. 
166) . 
Fehlauer submitted an offer of $115,000 on the southern 
portion, the Fehlauer parcel, on June 25, 1993. (R. 163). 
Schwartz reviewed the offer that day and insisted on the full 
2Schwartz's "lender" was the prior owner of the property, 
Robert Williams, who sold to Schwartz on contract all of the Madsen 
and Fehlauer parcels. (R. 162). 
3A written grace period in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
for both parcels Madsen bought extended the closing date in event 
of lender delay. (R. 165) . The closing for one of the parcels 
could not occur by July 6 because of Madsen's lender's delay, so 
the grace period applied to that parcel. (R. 165). Schwartz 
testified at his deposition that Madsen was also entitled to a 
grace period on the closing of her other parcel. (R. 184, p. 37) . 
It is entirely unclear why he so thought. The evidence is 
perfectly clear that he was the sole lender on the southernmost 
Madsen parcel and that (1) lender delay only occurred on the 
northernmost Madsen parcel, and (2) both the Madsen parcels had to 
sell or neither would. Schwartz then held all the cards when the 
lender on the northernmost parcel delayed. He recognizes this, but 
nonetheless permitted extension of the Madsen closing date. (R. 
184, p. 37). Had he not done so, Madsen would be in the position 
of questioning materiality. 
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listing price of $120,000. (R. 164). He sent a counteroffer to 
Fehlauer and added, among other things, a paragraph 6: 
Subject to Sale of House & Property located at 841 S.W. 
Hoytsville Rd., Coalville [the Madsen parcel] on or before 
July 6, 1993. 
(R. 164)(emphasis added). 
Schwartz had told his listing company, Coldwell Banker, that he 
did not want to sell the Fehlauer parcel until the Madsen parcel 
was sold. (R. 163). His listing agent suggested the date of 
July 6 simply to provide buffer time in case the Madsen property 
did not close as scheduled on July I.4 (R. 184, 279) . Schwartz 
confirmed at his deposition that the July 6 date was not impor-
tant to him: 
Q. Was the date of the 6th arbitrary in that it could have 
been the 5th or the 7th, or was there something magic 
about the 6th? 
A. The only reason the 6th was picked was because that's 
what Coldwell Banker said. They said can you give us 
on the Fehlauer transaction till the 6th because of any 
glitches that may or may not occur. 
(R. 184, p. 46). 
Fehlauer accepted on June 25, and Fehlauer and Schwartz 
signed an Earnest Money Sales Agreement that day. (R. 96-7; 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12). By its terms, the closing was to occur 
4When it became apparent in late June that the Madsen parcel 
would not close on July 1, Schwartz became angry and threatened to 
back out of the Fehlauer contract based upon his belief that he 
could do so if the Madsen property did not close by July 6. (R. 
253-4). His co-listing agent, Julie McKay, asked him why it was 
important to him that the Madsen property close by July 6, but 
could not get a reason. (R. 254). Similarly, plaintiff's counsel 
inquired at Schwartz' deposition and was told that since Schwartz 
had to make a balloon payment on all parcels to Williams on July 1, 
any date afterwards was "irrelevant." (R. 184, p. 77). 
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on August 13. (R. 167). Fehlauer completed all closing docu-
ments and paid the purchase price on August 11. (R. 167-8). It 
is undisputed that Fehlauer did everything expected of him, in a 
timely manner to complete the sale. Schwartz refused to honor 
the contract and never signed the closing documents. (R. 168). 
Fehlauer then commenced this action seeking specific performance. 
(R. 1-13). 
B. Schwartz And His Counsel Refused To Commit To The 
Resolution Of Fehlauer7s Action For Specific Performance. 
On February 4, 1994, after discovery had been completed, 
Fehlauer requested a trial setting. (R. 45-6) . Schwartz did not 
object to this request, and a scheduling conference was held on 
March 28. (R. 49-50, 150). During this conference Schwartz's 
counsel stated that her client was running for the Massachusetts 
state legislature and would not set foot out of Massachusetts 
until after the election. (R. 211). His counsel did not state 
that any particular date between March and the election would be 
objectionable; she instead lodged a veto against the entire 
three-month period from March until July. (R. 211). Fehlauer's 
counsel objected at the conference that such a late trial would 
cause Fehlauer to lose the whole construction year. (R 211). 
Judge Young then suggested that the trial be held during the 
week of April 4 because another trial that had been scheduled at 
that time would not occur. (R. 211). Fehlauer's counsel 
accepted this date. (R. 211). Schwartz's counsel, however, 
would not agree to it. (R. 211). Judge Young next stated that 
his calendar was clear during the week of May 9. (R. 211). 
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Fehlauer's counsel accepted. Schwartz's counsel again claimed 
that her client would not appear during that week because of his 
campaign. (R. 211). She also objected to scheduling a trial on 
May 12, as she had signed up for a CLE seminar on insurance law 
she refused to miss. (R. 211). 
C. Unable To Set A Trial Date To Which Schwartz Would Not 
Object, Judge Young Scheduled A Two-Day Trial At A Time That 
Schwartz Argued Would Inconvenience Him. 
Unable to find a date when he did not have other judicial 
obligations and with which Schwartz's counsel would agree, Judge 
Young concluded the March 28 conference by setting a two-day 
trial on May 10 and 11. (R. 212). After this date had been set, 
Schwartz's counsel filed a Motion for Continuance which stated 
for the first time that the Massachusetts primary election would 
take place on May 10.5 (R. 55). Judge Young denied the motion 
but expressed that he could accommodate the trial any day during 
the week of May 10. (R. 82). He also noted that Fehlauer's 
counsel had offered to present his case on May 10, which would 
allow Schwartz to travel to Utah after the primary and present 
his case on May 11. (R. 157-8). 
The trial court conducted a pretrial conference at the 
Summit County Courthouse on April 26, 1994. (R. 212). Judge 
Young again tried to find a trial date with which Schwartz's 
counsel would agree, suggesting all dates he had available in 
5Schwartz's counsel attached to her objection a letter from a 
Massachusetts town clerk noting that Schwartz was a candidate for 
State Representative and that the primary would occur on May 10. 
The letter did not state that Schwartz's attendance was required at 
the primary. (R. 62). 
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both Coalville and Salt Lake City through June 30; Schwartz's 
counsel refused all of these. (R. 212). Next, Judge Young 
offered June 28 as a trial date. (R. 212). This date was 
inconvenient for Judge Young since he was required to attend a 
Judicial Council meeting in Blaine County, Idaho, the next 
afternoon. It was similarly inconvenient for Fehlauer's counsel 
since he was expected to preside over a Utah State Bar Commission 
meeting in the same venue that same day. (R. 158). Despite the 
difficulty, Fehlauer's counsel agreed to this date. (R. 158). 
Schwartz's counsel again refused to commit that her client could 
attend on June 28 or any other date before mid-July. (R. 158, 
212) . 
Finally, Judge Young attempted to be flexible with the 
scheduled trial date on May 10 by exchanging dates with another 
trial scheduled for May 12. (R. 212, 228-9). He proposed that 
Schwartz attend the primary on May 10, travel to Utah and prepare 
for trial with his counsel on May 11 and the morning of May 12, 
and appear at a trial to begin on the afternoon of May 12. (R. 
212-3). Although this proposal would give Schwartz's counsel one 
and a half days to prepare for trial with her client, she 
protested that she needed at least two days of face-to-face 
preparation for this two-day trial, (R. 213) despite her having 
earlier produced Schwartz for deposition and presumably having 
considerable opportunity to communicate with him by telephone, 
mail and facsimile transmittal, the latter of which Schwartz used 
extensively in negotiating the sale. She further informed Judge 
Young that she would not miss the insurance CLE seminar she had 
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scheduled for herself for May 12. (R. 213). Optionless, Judge 
Young concluded that the trial should proceed as scheduled on May 
10-11. (R. 213). 
D. Schwartz's Counsel Appeared At Trial But Was Instructed 
By Her Absent Client Not To Present A Case. 
Schwartz's counsel appeared at trial on May 10 and renewed 
her objection to the trial setting at the outset. (R. 220). 
Judge Young responded by observing that this lawsuit involves the 
equitable remedy of specific performance and the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement had been signed nearly a year ago, necessitating 
an early trial date. (R. 223) . He further explained how he made 
every effort to accommodate Schwartz's itinerary, offering every 
date he had available, but that Schwartz had rejected each date. 
(R. 226, 230-1). While Judge Young recognized a party's interest 
in attending his trial, he pointed out not only that he had 
exerted every effort to satisfy that interest, but that 
Schwartz's counsel might have considered missing her CLE seminar 
in order to serve her client. (R. 234-5). Judge Young denied 
the objection of Schwartz's counsel and permitted the trial to 
proceed. (R. 236). Schwartz's counsel at this time objected to 
the use of Schwartz's deposition, giving the curious explanation 
that because he was not present to testify at trial, his previous 
sworn testimony should be excluded, even though by her own 
representation he was outside the court's process. (R. 237). 
She then explained that her client had instructed her not to 
present a case and moved to the back of the courtroom, where she 
remained for the rest of the trial. (R. 243-4). 
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E. Finding That Schwartz Breached His Contract With 
Fehlauer, Judge Young Ordered Specific Performance, 
On June 16, 1994, Judge Young entered a decree of specific 
performance in Fehlauer's favor. (R. 173-7). He noted in his 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that although the con-
tract for the Fehlauer parcel contained the July 6 date, time was 
not of the essence. (R. 168) . There was no evidence, including 
from Scwartz's deposition, that the July 6 date was material; it 
only mattered that the Madsen parcel sell before the Fehlauer 
parcel, which it did. (R. 169-71). Since all material terms of 
the contract were met, Schwartz had to comply with the contract. 
As an alternate ground for relief, Judge Young noted that the 
extension of the closing date by fifteen days contained in the 
Madsen contract also extended the July 6 provision in the 
Fehlauer contract that discussed the Madsen parcel. (R. 171). 
Since the Madsen parcel closed by on July 16, the Fehlauer 
contract remained viable. (R. 171). In the third alternate 
ground for relief, Judge Young removed the July 6 phrase from the 
Fehlauer contract so that the word "sale" would be emphasized. 
(R. 171). Pursuant to agreements already in place by July 6, the 
Madsen parcel had been sold. (R. 171) . Thus, the terms of the 
Fehlauer contract were met. (R. 171). Because Schwartz breached 
the contract without justification, Judge Young compelled speci-
fic performance. (R. 171). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Judge Young did not abuse his broad discretion in 
declining to postpone the trial of this specific performance 
action to some unknown date that might be convenient for 
Schwartz. Judge Young offered several trial dates that would not 
interfere with Schwartz's participation in the primary, but 
Schwartz rejected them all. The court's decision at this point 
to retain the originally-scheduled date with the knowledge that 
Schwartz would have to miss only the presentation of Fehlauer's 
case and not his own did not amount to misuse of the trial 
court's scheduling authority. Schwartz's request that this Court 
award him with a new trial after he instructed his attorney not 
to present his case at the actual trial should not be granted. 
POINT II: Regardless of whether the sale of the Madsen 
parcel was a condition precedent, it was not a condition prece-
dent that the Madsen parcel be sold on or before July 6 and time 
was not of the essence. There is no evidence that the July 6 
date was material to Schwartz, so the fact that the Madsen parcel 
closed shortly after July 6 cannot render the Fehlauer contract 
null and void. 
POINT III: Judge Young's focus on the word "sale" in para-
graph 6 of the Fehlauer contract did not amount to a reformation 
of the contract. Rather, Judge Young noted as an alternate 
ground for relief that the Madsen contract did sell by July 6. 
Schwartz's arguments about whether paragraph 6 was a condition 
precedent aside, the "sale" occurred within the specified time as 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY DECLINING TO POSTPONE 
THE TRIAL IN THIS MATTER 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 40(b), provides that 
after a party shows good cause for postponing a trial, the trial 
court has discretion to grant a continuance. Schwartz's major 
argument on appeal is that Judge Young abused this discretion by 
setting a trial when he was participating in a primary election 
on the first day of trial. This Court can only reverse Judge 
Young's decision if he acted unreasonably under the circumstances 
of this case. Radcliffe v. Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608, 610-11 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
Judge Young did not act unreasonably in retaining the 
scheduled trial date of May 10-11 even though Schwartz's counsel 
later informed the court that her client was participating in a 
primary election on May 10. Schwartz was not prevented from 
attending the trial; he has never offered proof that he was 
required to be in Massachusetts for the primary election. At any 
ratef he could have travelled to Utah after the primary and 
presented his case on May 11. 
While Judge Young offered Schwartz every date available on 
his calendar in a three-month period6, proposed switching dates 
6Schwartz opines that Judge Young "apparently" thought he had 
to preside over the trial and was trying to cram the trial in 
before his term in Summit County ended on June 30. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 13). While Judge Young reminded Schwartz's counsel at 
trial that he had gone through his calendar and offered every date 
he was available until the expiration of his term in Summit County 
12 
with another previously-scheduled trial, and suggested conducting 
the trial on the day before his attendance was required at the 
Judicial Conference meeting at great inconvenience to him (and 
similar inconvenience to Fehlauer's counsel), Schwartz refused to 
leave Massachusetts until the elections ended and the summer 
legislative session ended.7 Schwartz never explained why his 
campaigning for a seat on a state legislature was so intense that 
he could not spare a day or two to accommodate a court of this 
state. Instead, his bare contention that he was confined to 
Massachusetts until after the election and subsequent legislative 
session were to hold Fehlauer, Fehlauer's counsel, and a Utah 
tribunal at bay for more than three months. 
Schwartz's intransigence notwithstanding, Judge Young 
finally reached what he thought was an "ideal" solution by 
offering to switch another trial scheduled on May 12 and hold the 
trial in this case on the afternoon of May 12. Schwartz could 
attend the primary in Massachusetts, travel to Utah afterwards, 
spend a day and a half preparing in person with his counsel, and 
(R. 226), he never took the position that the trial could not be 
held afterwards. At any rate, Schwartz's counsel could not be 
definite on her client's availability after June 30. She vaguely 
stated that her client could make a trial after mid-July but still 
would not commit him to a specific date. (R. 236). Fehlauer's 
counsel did not want to schedule a trial that far into the future 
without a representation that he would not later object to that 
date, as well. (R. 228). 
7Schwartz maintains that as events worked out, he could have 
been available to attend trial any time after June 7 because he was 
defeated in the general election on that day. This after-the-fact 
rationale is irrelevant; at the time the court was setting a trial 
date, Schwartz's counsel would not agree to any date before mid-
July. 
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present his case on May 12. Again, Schwartz's counsel rejected 
this proposal, stating that a day and a half of preparation was 
not sufficient; she needed at least two days of face-to-face 
preparation. She also would not miss a legal education seminar 
on insurance she wanted to attend on May 12. 
Judge Young thus retained the original May 10-11 setting not 
because he unreasonably wanted to prevent Schwartz from attend-
ing, but because Schwartz objected to any and all dates he or 
Fehlauer's counsel proposed. Even with the trial proceeding as 
scheduled, nothing prevented Schwartz from attending the trial on 
May 11. Schwartz chose not to be present. He ordered his 
attorney to attend but not to argue his case. After declining to 
attend his trial, Schwartz now contends that Judge Young abused 
his discretion by not continuing the trial to some later time 
when he would find it convenient to attend. 
The facts of this case do not convey an abuse of discretion 
in setting the trial date; neither can Schwartz offer legal 
authority to support his main argument on appeal. Citing 
Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977), Schwartz notes 
that courts have held it to be an abuse of discretion not to 
grant a continuance where counsel has objected, given notice, and 
tried to have the trial date changed for good cause. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 10). Even if Schwartz's counsel did this,8 though, 
8Trying to change a trial date based upon the unsupported claim 
that attendance at a primary is required the first day of trial, 
when the party can attend the next day, does not constitute good 
cause. At any rate, Rule 40(b) provides that even if the party 
makes a showing of good cause for continuance, the trial court 
still has discretion to deny the continuance. 
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Judge Young did not automatically abuse his discretion in not 
granting the continuance because abuse of discretion does not 
hinge upon these three factors alone. 
For instance, a court may abuse its discretion in denying a 
continuance where the party has made itself available on other 
dates open on the court's docket. See Bairas v. Johnson, 
373 P.2d 375, 378 (Utah 1962) (court abused discretion in not 
granting continuance where no evidence of malingering by party). 
As discussed above, Schwartz would never commit to a specific 
date, instead rejecting every date suggested by Fehlauer or the 
court. 
Additionally, the court can abuse its discretion by holding 
a trial when the party cannot attend and when his live testimony 
is particularly important. Id. at 375, 378 (little reason to 
grant continuance to absent party if testimony at trial not 
crucial). Schwartz could have attended the trial on May 11 but 
chose not to be present. His live testimony was not particularly 
essential to the disposition of the case; the trial was not 
before a jury, and Judge Young considered Schwartz's deposition 
in reaching his decision. In State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 714-
5 (Utah App. 1993), this Court affirmed the trial court's denial 
of the continuance of a criminal trial even though a witness 
could not be present to testify; it was sufficient that her 
deposition was read to the jury. 
The trial court may also abuse its discretion if the moving 
party shows that it was materially prejudiced by the denial or 
that the result would have been different if the continuance had 
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been granted. State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 
1991). Schwartz has not made this showing. To the contrary, he 
prejudiced himself by instructing his attorney not to argue his 
case at trial. After choosing to pass up his opportunity to 
present a defense, he cannot now ask this Court for another bite 
at the apple. 
After numerous reasonable but fruitless attempts to find a 
trial date with which Schwartz would agree, Judge Young decided 
to stick to the originally-scheduled date--a date that might have 
inconvenienced Schwartz but certainly did not preclude his 
attendance. Judge Young did not abuse his substantial discretion 
in declining to postpone the trial in this specific performance 
action to some unknown date. 
POINT II 
JUDGE YOUNG CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
THE JULY 6 DATE WAS NOT MATERIAL 
TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEHLAUER CONTRACT. 
The trial court's first ground for granting specific 
performance of the Fehlauer contract was that the failure of the 
Madsen parcel to close by July 6 was not fatal to enforcement 
because the Madsen contract closed within a reasonable time after 
July 6. In its second alternate ground for relief, the court 
determined that the extension of the closing date on the Madsen 
parcel by fifteen days also extended the July 6 provision in the 
Fehlauer contract regarding the Madsen parcel by the same amount 
of time. Since the Madsen contract closed within those fifteen 
days, the Fehlauer contract remained viable. (R. 171). Both 
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grounds for relief draw upon the same factual finding, that the 
July 6 date was not material. (R. 168-9). To challenge the 
first and second grounds for relief, Schwartz must marshal the 
evidence to show that the trial court's finding was clearly 
erroneous. Ong Intern., 850 P.2d at 454 n.25. 
Rather than marshalling the evidence on the trial court's 
finding of no materiality, which he cannot do for dearth of raw 
material, Schwartz devotes his second argument on appeal to 
arguing that the sale of the Madsen parcel was a condition 
precedent to enforcement of the Fehlauer contract. For purposes 
of this appeal, Fehlauer does not dispute that the sale was a 
condition precedent. However, it was not a condition precedent 
that the sale occur on or before July 6.9 Since this phrase was 
not material, it was just essential that the sale occur within a 
reasonable time afterwards. 
9Schwartz argues that the July 6 clause is also a condition 
precedent, citing three Utah cases involving strict compliance with 
conditions precedent. None of these cases deals with the pertinent 
issue of whether a date accompanying an act precedent to enforce-
ment of the contract also is a condition precedent. Furthermore, 
the cases are factually dissimilar to this case because the act 
precedent to performance never occurred. Woodard v. Jensen, 740 
P.2d 272 (Utah App. 1987) (recording of lot never occurred); 
Braithwaite v. Sorenson. 561 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah 1977) 
(government tax lien never released); Welch Transfer and Storage, 
Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983) (SBA's approval of 
reciprocal loan assumption never occurred in manner contemplated by 
parties) . It is not surprising that the courts in these cases 
strictly enforced the conditions precedent when the act precedent 
never took place. In this case the act precedent occurred very 
shortly after the time designated in the contract. 
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A. The Trial Court's Finding That July 6 Was Not Material 
Is Grounded In The Evidence. 
Schwartz has the burden of showing that the trial court's 
factual finding was clearly erroneous. However, Judge Young drew 
upon sufficient evidence to support his finding. Schwartz 
indicated to his listing agent that he did not want to sell the 
Fehlauer parcel until he had sold the Madsen parcel. The Madsen 
parcel was scheduled to closed on July 1; his listing agent 
suggested the date of July 6 as a buffer date in case the closing 
of the Madsen parcel were delayed. Schwartz acceded even though 
this required him to borrow money to pay his own seller, Robert 
Williams, on or before July 1. This borrowing is the only 
detriment Schwartz can point to, and it occurred with or without 
the Fehlauer sale. Schwartz has never claimed, as he cannot, 
that the particular date of July 6 or the time between July 6 and 
July 16 held any importance to him. (R. 184, pp. 46, 76-7.) 
In a case dealing with a similar contractual clause, 
Honeyman v. Clostermann, 753 P.2d 1384 (Or. App. 1988), overruled 
on other grounds, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's 
finding that a provision requiring a land sale to close "on or 
before April 10" did not contain a material date. As in this 
case, the parties designated the particular date as a target date 
by which they expected the prerequisites to closing would be met, 
not as a deadline they felt had to be met for the contract to be 
enforceable. Id. at 1387. Judge Young's finding of no materi-
ality is supported by the record and is therefore not clearly 
erroneous. 
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Concluding That The July 
6 Date Could Be Extended For A Reasonable Time Because Time Was 
Not Of The Essence. 
The trial court entered a factual finding, also subject to 
clearly erroneous review, that the July 6 clause in the Fehlauer 
contract was not a "time is of the essence" provision. (R. 168). 
Schwartz disputes this finding, pointing out that time can be of 
the essence in land contracts when there is language requiring an 
avoidance of the contract if the "deadline" is not met. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-9). As a preliminary matter, there 
was no deadline in the Fehlauer contract; the trial court entered 
a subsidiary factual finding that the July 6 date was not a drop-
dead date but merely a target date. (R. 169). Furthermore, 
Schwartz claims that there was language in the Fehlauer contract 
requiring an avoidance but fails to identify the language. If 
Schwartz is contending that the words "subject to" constitute the 
avoidance language, circularity problems arise. Schwartz would 
effectively be arguing that anytime a contract recites an act and 
a date by which the act is to be performed, time automatically 
becomes of the essence. Conditions precedent and "time of the 
"essence" clauses are not mechanically equivalent in the law. 
The trial court correctly found that the July 6 clause was 
not a "time is of the essence" provision; the contract did not 
explicitly state such language, the contract did not specifically 
call for avoidance if a deadline were not met, and surrounding 
circumstances did not imply that timeliness of performance was of 
paramount concern. Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 552 (Utah 
App. 1987). When time is not of the essence, dates contained in 
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land contracts can be extended for a reasonable period of time. 
Century 21 All Western Real Estate v. Webb, 645 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 
1982); Huck v. Hayes, 560 P.2d 1124 (Utah 1977). The trial court 
therefore did not err as a matter of law in concluding in its 
second ground for relief that the July 6 date could be extended 
for a reasonable period of time afterwards. 
C. The Trial Court's Conclusion That The July 6 Provision 
Could Be Extended Concurrent With The Extension On The Madsen 
Parcel Was Proper. 
Schwartz added the July 6 clause to the Fehlauer contract 
when it still seemed possible for the Madsen contract to close by 
July 1. Although the Madsen contract was scheduled by its terms 
to close by that date, Schwartz voluntarily allowed the fifteen-
day grace period in the contract to apply when it became apparent 
that the closing could not occur by July 1. The Madsen contract 
could thus close by July 16, which it did. 
The trial court's application of the fifteen-day extension 
to the Fehlauer contract was not improper because that 
application simply incorporated the changes to the Madsen closing 
date. In Walker v. Feiring. 632 P.2d 1270 (Or. App. 1981), the 
court upheld the application of a closing date extension from one 
land sales contract to another under similar circumstances. The 
vendors in Walker were selling several parcels of land as a 
"package," just as Schwartz wanted to sell the Madsen parcel 
close in time to the Fehlauer parcel. The buyers contracted to 
purchase several parcels in the package. The earnest money sales 
agreement required the closing on each parcel to occur within ten 
days after the issuance of an occupancy permit and stated that 
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time was of the essence. Nonetheless, the parties closed more 
than ten days after the issuance of the permit. The buyers 
purchased more parcels in the package and once again the closing 
did not occur within ten days after issuance of the permit. This 
time, however, the sellers refused to close, citing the explicit 
time provision in the contract. 
The trial court affirmed the trial court's judgment of 
specific performance on these parcels because the sellers had 
tolerated an extension of the closing date on the first batch of 
parcels in the package. Id. at 1272. By extending the closing 
date the first time, the sellers effectively agreed to an 
extension on the closing date contained in the contracts covering 
the second batch of parcels. Id. at 1273. 
In this case this Court has even greater reason to uphold 
the trial court's application of the closing date extension to 
the Fehlauer contract because unlike Walker, the closing dates 
here concerned the same piece of land, the Madsen parcel. Since 
Schwartz had agreed with extending the Madsen closing date to 
July 16, the trial court acted properly in determining that 
paragraph 6 in the Fehlauer contract was to be treated in 
parallel fashion.10 
10
 Had Schwartz tried to abort the Madsen contracts for failure 
to close by July 6, Madsen could have pointed out the immateriality 




SINCE THE SALE OF THE MADSEN 
PARCEL OCCURRED ON OR BEFORE JULY 6, 
THE ACT PRECEDENT TO PERFORMANCE OF 
THE FEHLAUER CONTRACT OCCURRED. 
Schwartz's final argument on appeal addresses the trial 
court's third alternate ground for relief, that paragraph 6 of 
the Fehlauer contract could be "reformed" to read: "Subject to 
sale of house & property located at 841 S.W Hoytsville Rd, 
Coalville to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements already in 
place." (R. 171, emphasis in original). Schwartz latches onto 
the trial court's use of the word "reform," arguing that the 
trial court could not reform the contract without finding a 
mutual mistake of fact. 
The trial court did not substitute the July 6 provision with 
the language "to Nancy Madsen pursuant to agreements already in 
place" in its Findings and Conclusions to memorialize a rewriting 
of the contract. It did so to illustrate how a certain term in 
the clause, "sale," could be emphasized by covering up the 
language on which the parties had been focusing with language 
that more fully explained the term "sale." 
Thus, the trial court's third ground for relief was not that 
the contract could be reformed, but that the condition calling 
for the sale of the Madsen property on or before July 6 had 
occurred. By emphasizing the word "sale" in the provision, the 
trial court recognized Schwartz's understanding and intention 
that the Fehlauer property not be sold until the Madsen property 
was sold. (R. 163, 171). 
22 
Schwartz and Madsen signed the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
for the Madsen parcel on May 20. On this date, the sale of the 
parcel occurred as a matter of law, subject only to financing 
requirements.11 The sale of property occurred when the earnest 
money sales agreement was signed. Pursuant to the earnest money 
sales agreement already in place, the Madsen property had been 
sold on or before July 6• 
If this Court were to determine that the July 6 provision in 
the Fehlauer contract was a condition precedent, the condition 
was satisfied because the sale of the Madsen property occurred 
well before July 6. The trial court did not err in reaching this 
third alternate ground for relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Schwartz has not presented any reason for this Court to 
reverse the trial court's decree of specific performance in this 
matter. Schwartz should not receive an extra shot at a trial 
because Judge Young did not misuse his broad discretion in 
declining to postpone the trial in this matter to some unknown 
date convenient for Schwartz. This Court should not reverse the 
trial court's ruling that the July 6 date in the Fehlauer 
contract could be extended reasonably; the court's finding that 
the date was not material drew on substantial evidence, and the 
court's conclusion that this nonmaterial date could be lengthened 
is justified by law. Finally, even if this Court determined that 
Mrs. Madsen qualified as a borrower without difficulty. 
The appraiser for the lender required longer than anticipated to 
locate comparables to justify his appraisal. 
23 
the entire clause at issue in the Fehlauer contract were a con-
dition precedent, that condition was met when the Madsen parcel 
sold on May 20. Based upon the foregoing, Fehlauer respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm the trial court's judgment. 
DATED this 3rd day of January, 1995. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
H. 'Jafc^ s Cl^gg 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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REALTOR® 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
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A INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating 
ir-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, wir 
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>its production Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection 
Slid inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer 
Z SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has no 
• will not be remedied prior to closing, (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shal 
3 brought current on or before closing, and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or if 
atisfactory working condition at closing 
D CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adequate supply of water am 
mtinued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right 
E CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Sellei 
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F ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages 
teds of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
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•prove the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing In such case, 
earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth 
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G TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
a preliminary title report on the subject property Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title, 
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i encumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
all, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated Seller agrees to pay any 
r>cellation charge 
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
:opy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
closing, Buyer shall take title subject to such leases If the objections) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be null and void 
I. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases 
ered into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer 
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3 CONDITION AND CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. Seller represents that Seller'^ holds title to the property in fee simple • is purchasing the property under a real 
ate contract Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth in Section S Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title to the property, subject 
incumbrances and exceptions noted herein, evidenced b y ^ a current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price D an abstract of title brought current, 
i an attorney's opinion (See Section H) ^ ^ 
4 INSPECTION OF TITLE In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing Buyer shall take title 
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8 CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before ^i^\J^J \ , 1 ^ 3 ** a reasonable location to be designated by 
Her, subject to Section Q Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
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^ "•(?/) (AMffffi) / r t * / ^ , 19 *?^ to accept this offer Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 




re) (Date) (Address) (Phone) (SSWTAX ID) 
uyer's Signature) (Date) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
HECK ONE 
3 ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above 
3 M I C T I O N Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
&TOUNTER OFFER Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
(AM/PM) , 19 to accept the terms presents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance Buyer shall have until. 
specified below 
(Date) (Time) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID 
(Date) (Time) (Address) teller's Signature) 
,HECK ONE 
3 ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
D REJECTION Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER (Buyer's Initials) 
D COUNTER OFFER Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX ID 
Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
iokir to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed 
•IGNATl 
.eipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures 




B D I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on. 
Date 
, 19 . 
K AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this Agreement on ifc behalf warran 
his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller 
L COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels ar 
md all prior negotiations representations warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agre< 
Tient This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties 
M COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreemer 
tot expressly modified or excluded therein 
N DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damage 
»r to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express conditio 
•r contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned t 
tuyer Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses 
tcludmg a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap 
licable law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in 
rpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from th< 
arnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shal 
e interpleaded into court in accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney'! 
•es incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action 
O ABROGATION. Except for express warranties'made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement 
P RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there is loss or damage to the property betweer 
e date hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percenl 
0%) of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property 
tor to closing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repaii 
replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed 
Q TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
9, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
te shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein Thereafter, 
te is of the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
livered by all parties to the transaction 
R CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (%) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise reqmred by the lending institution Costs of providing 
9 insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8 Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
closing 
> REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex-
ited herein If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
Gaining Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
ate contract therein 
NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
he event with respect to which notice is required If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
utomatically terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the 
tet or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice 
BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office 
DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
iE FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. 
5 FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL - JULY 1, 1987 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes ( ) a COUNTER OFFER ( ) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the I S day of £ V f c V , 1 ^ 3 3 - . between 
/ ^ J A u S f c N as buyer(s), and O c O A 5 t T ? ^ as seller(s), 
covering real property described as follows 
O^LjiKr , (VTftB 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT. 
t I M S C ^ ^ I L Y t l£» Q O ^ T \ ^ ^ T OTsL T W ^ -Q^lltsc^ ib>o ^ 
l ^ i ^ * T,^ T^yvu Kotv^ ^r>^f HOT e/fosy 'BuycuL, X) r»c^v^/ Golfer* 
m c>j> Turing o ^ o^. XS^ciwc CTcy^^3 ,^^(3^ 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ^ Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until ^ " ^ Q (A M / F ^ > 
frVA) <1 1941.. to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
Date Fh^N t^> 1 ^ 3 Signature of ( 
1 " < 5 ^ ( A M / P M ) ~~Z/J Time 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER REJECTION 
the foregoing on the terms specified above 
the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached 3 Addendum A S>^~9 
Signature Date Time 
{ ) I hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
(%~c*<u 
Signature of Buyer(sl Date Signature of Seller(s) Date 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Sent by 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes fcx) a COUNTER OFFER ( ) an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the JJ5 day of May , i g 9 3 , between 
Madsen
 as buyer(s). and Swart z a s seiier(s), 
covering real property described as follows: 
841 SW Hoytsville Rd. 
Coalville, Utah 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT. 
The following terms shall be incorporated into the agreement; 
1. Buyer to pay for any and all survey and legal work, as may be required 
to create the parcel under this contract. 
2.It shall be at the Sellers option to elect to continue with this 
contract, pending the seller obtaining a contract on the adjoining 
17 acres. The seller will notify the buyer of his decision by no 
later than June -fr»rl993. 
3_J* 0+r~ 




^V A . 19 93 , to accept the terms specified above Un^i 
( A . M ^ M > ) 
Signatur* 
ddendum shall lapse, 
uyer 
ACCEPT ANCE'COUNTER OFFER REJECTION 
Check/One 
(L^H hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above. 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum. 
£ /Signature Signature Date 
{ ) I hereby reject the foregoing . . (Initials) 
Time 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures. 
Signature of Buyer(s) Date Signature of Seller(s) 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 , by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Sent by 
Date 
EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT I f EXHIBIT 
H5« *•**> N 0 ( 0 ) EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT | | ? 
fie undersigned Buyer — hereby deposits with Brokerage 
EARNEST MONEY, the amount of F»OrV k o ^ ^ t y g . Q fr *°/~t,*±*y- "~~ Dollars ( P f S m ^ ). 
:h shall be deposited in accordance with applicable State Law. • / * f " — " N x
 A 
kerage Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
. PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MJJNEY is grverr ta secure and appty on the purchase opht property situated at A l M / £> 
?HI £>t£> H ^ v H S o i l l f c ^ ,n the City of C V T f t L ^ i t l t . County of ^ L > T v rTv l T _ , Utah, 
lect to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility orjxther easements or nghts of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
wdancetwith Section G. Said property is owned by C^>( f^ ^ n fT \
 m as sellers, and is more particularly described 
Tv^rpd&y £> -"523* agaaa PIPITS.. To^toUfruJ \H yarr,->rrvi, *fr.gy^V 
HECK APPLICABLE BOXES/***1* * c * w * 
^UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Vacant Lot ^ V a c a n t Acreage • Other . , 
3 IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Commercial D Residential • Condo D Other 
(a) Included items. Unless'exciuded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section -A if presently attached to the~propetty. 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title. HOMY . 
(b) Excluded Item*. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale:. 
(c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price 
13 public sewer O connected £fy well G connected Q other y&^electnaty E:bonnected 
S septic tank C3 connected yK^ irrigation water / secondary system Q ingress &-egress by private easement 
0 other sanitary system # of ***** T T \ f i Company tested toad ^Cpaved 
9 public water X3 connected CS TV antenna O master antenna £ 3 prewired & curb and gutter 
3 pnvate water Q connected C natural gas Q connected Q other rights 
y*+J pnor to closing^S^ s 
ana subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it i 
(d) Survey. A certified survey Q shall be furnished at the expense of j^^ D n o r t 0 c ^ ' ^ g y ^ sn*N n^t be furnished 
(e) Buyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property in its present physics 
condition, except: _ 
PURCHASE PfllCE AND FINANCING. The total purchase pnce for the property is F t y t T t S > J t k ^ o s A ^ / f r v a t r * 0 / * 
Dollars ( i ^ t , ^ / ^ Q & ^ ^ ) which shall be paid as follows 
5 c O which represents the aforedescnbed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
lo<3C> representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
_ £ 2 representingihe approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyei 
which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which indude: D principal; D interest, D taxes; • insurance; D condo fees; dother 
£* * representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to b 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
which include: D pnnctpal; D interest; D taxes, Q insurance; D condo fees, D other 
i ^ / Q C P representing balance* if any, including proceeds trom-B«-*ew«<*e*§«9ertea*pef setter financing, to be paid AS follows: ^ > c U ^ T \ , T ^ 
CAiXtty S ^ * , IJ* Tnu-rr TVg^P # g ^ Utnrn. ^ny .v^csrts t o 3 c A t ^:*Uo«usV 
& £ » WLWCICAL 7<tL^L?CT i^v &h*tl "Be Q\l * 3 i * I^ OCVTV <,)*, lytLfiZL^/rSS 
VjOQO TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
f Buyer is required to assume an underlying.obligation <tn which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing, Buyer agrees to use best effon 
assume and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agree 
make application within. N I K _ days after Setter's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation and/or obtain the new-^ nflrlclng i 
interest rate not to exceed | Q tfr %. If Buyer does not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within h-) ^ days after Seller's acceptahc 
this Agreement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to fr^S ^  mortgage loan discoui 




ON AND c g n v t T A m * v r . . . « _ *~..w. ,^, 
act Transfer of Seller's ownership interest shall be made as set forth Fn Section S. Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable tme to the property subject 
orance* and exceptions rioted hirtn, evidenced byN^a "current policy of title insurance in the amount, of purchase" price d an abetracTof mie brought ournwri^  
's opinion (See Section H). , * ^ '* % 
INSPECTION OF TITLE, m accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to Jnjpect the We to the subject property prior TO dosing. Buyer that talcs title 
a). Buyer U hasX has not reviewed an^oondominiumCu4R'i to signing this Agr eameiJt^  
lie 
, SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the following items are also warranted: ^ V \ ^ > T & ^ 
a to ai.y enstmg restnetrve oovenapts,^ inciuding condominium reetn£bpns (CO A R'a). Buyer U hasy has not reviewed an^ onjdominiu  C u * R'spnor to sig ing to 
VESTING OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: ftpyZSK. " V " } " j f r T T l ^ f ^ V M ^ ~^>T>JlfMt. *Tfo QAp jS fT f r * * . 
ptions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the. following:!. 
. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to trie following special cw>tftk)ns^ anoVbr contir»c^^k i^esJrfilch, must be^ aansflec? 
CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be dosed oo or before ^ u V v / ± .. 1 9 ^ L 2 L a t a reasonable,location to. be designatedJby. 
>r, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shaM deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
Agreement Prorations set forth in Section R snail be made as of ^JB date of possession D date of dosing D other" 
I. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on "ft *TH. e>^ c+ (x*t < * J unless extended by written agreement of parties, 
.represents V ^ Seller f " } Buyer'; 
-5 unles  extended byi
I AQgMCV PtSCLOSUPE At m« rigninp of thi> AQnmmant ttm lifting «gimt% MstK Af /t^j{ }***'** ^ 
the selling agent ^y^(NJ& ( > ^ » i*)**S represents f ) Seller Qi^ LBuytr- Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
en disclosure of the agency relationship^) was provided to rum/her. |^£>4 ( > Buyer's initials ( .*• ) { \ Setter's initiatSL 
1. GENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE*SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEK 
JEPTED BY THE BUYER AND SELLER AND ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS AGREEMENT BY REFERENCE. 
2. AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME UMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers'to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Setter aha* 
s tinttt3"-£XS (AMfgfrfr / M A V l ^ , 1 0 ^ 3 , to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shaU lapse and the Agent shall return the EARNEST 
NEY to the Buvjar. v — * ' ~ * . " . " * 
rWs i >
 r
 ^ — » — Signature) ' (Date) (Address) / ( P h o n e ) (SSN/TAX ID] 
yer's Signature) Pate) (Address) {Phone) (SSN/TAXTD 
ECKONE 
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the teems and conditions specified above. 
RUCTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregomg offer (Seller's initials) 
''COUNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or In'the attached Addendum, ar* 
•resents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance/Buyer shall have until (AM/PM) , 19 to accept the term 
ipecified below. 
* (Date) (Time) (Address) j»jt (Phone) (SSNtfTAX II /  ||
(Date) (Time) (Address) sfler's Signature) 
4ECK ONE: 
1 ACCEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
2 REJECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyers Initials) 
3 COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
(Phone) (SSN/TAX II 
Oyer's Signature) Pate) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) fTlme) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires looker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be complete 
A. • I ££Qovd£cJ9® feflsip^of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: jree ent beanng all signatures: 
/ / SIGNATURE OF BUYERL, 
."aosa 
B. G I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on. 
k-^~—. *«-„ _ „ _ 4 — lm4 mHakf^mA ^ ^ *> the • SeHer DBuyer. Sent by 
. .19 . 
ADDENDUM/COUNTEROFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Thit ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes ( ) a COUNTER OFFER 7?S • " ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT}4at«d tb« L 5 day of A ^ A ^ , T « l ^ hatwawn 
/ ^ f t ~ t > * > t > l „ buyer(s). and < S o ^ < V C r t _ aasetter(s). 
covering real properly described as follows _ . 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT 
X ^ I L t k tLVX. " b n > \ O t . / S / * » » y i > y y o T » » H »"&cy*JT*-X t->o»%«- l i CoOA.e»vrrL^ V ) » « ^ m C o ^ ^ ^ c T 
CjRHi SCPO H O j / T g u i l l C t f c ^ f\roz> T V e . (">-£ A c a e . > c ^ T V v . S o o ^ k ^ t W ^ t v r y 
Q \ 4 t k c ^ o o t U C C > A I 1 1*><^  Q K A T ^ a Qg>»vraACT c^r4 o ^ w 3 t r c ^ » ^ » * * * . l £ i H I S -
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same fttf Seller ( ) Buyer shall have until Q * Q Q (A Mf^jfr) 
, to accept the terms specified above Unless so acceptectthis Addendum shall lapse 
Date N ^ W & i n ? ^ - — « _ Signature of ( ) Seller f ^ g u y e r 
Time * 1 : t S ? A \ ( A M / P M ) / / C H = ^ <^ ' 
ACCEPTANCE COUNTER OFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT ihe foregoing on the terms specified above 
(C^nNereby T ^ Q ^ ? v h e foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum s e  * 
Signature Signature Date Tim* 
(* ) I hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
l^cx^Q 
Signature of Buyer(s) Date Signature of SeUer(s) Date 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Sent by 
This form has been eoDroved bv the Utah Real Estate Commission 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes- 4X) * COUNTEROFFER < ) an ADDENDUM lo that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the 1$ day of M a j
 t J 9 _ i 2 . , between 
K a d s e n asbuyer(s) and S w a r t z asseiter(s). 
covenng real property described as follows 
/ 2.84 acres ad1. 841 SV Boytsvllle 
Coalville, Utah 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT* 
1. Seller to hold a mortgage of $13,000 9 8Z interest. Interest to be paid 
seal-annually with the first payment due on Jan 1,1994 and every (6) 
six months thereafter. Interest paynent to be based on outstanding 
principal. Principal yaymenA to be a bailqn,jMb_the ytd tof j60 months.. 
There will be no pre-paypent penalty. 
2.This contract shall invltide 1.5 shares of water. Title to the water shares 
shall ^ remainfwith the seller until the note is paid in fulll 
3. IT shall be*\t the^eller's option to continue with this contractf pgnrHng 
seller obtaining a contract on the adjoining 17 acres. Seller -must notify 
buyer in writing by no later than June ^,1993 
^VA*— 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same ( ) Seller ( x ) Buyer shall have until 5 : 0 0 pf t * /p M ) 
.My 2 0 jg 9 3 to accept the terms specified above Unless so accepted fhjs Addendum shall lapse 
Date J '*^y * ,
 t ^ 4 Signature o/ iflj Sfe$)4rflff) JBuyer 
Time 
ACC&TAriCE/COUrtTfa OFFER REJfCTjbN 
Chec£j0ne 
( * T I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum 
I Signature Signature Date Time 
( ) I hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
rbuh* 
Signature of Buyers) Date Signature ohbeiler(s) Date 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 , by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer 
Sent by 
